Having established the current position of the various territorial claims in the South China Sea, we now take a closer look at the Indian Government’s involvement in the matter, despite not being geographically privy to the dispute nor having a territorial claim of their own.
INS Airavat Incident
On 22 July 2011, an Indian amphibious assault vessel, INS Airavat, heading towards Vietnam on a friendly visit, was contacted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (“PLA Navy”), 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast. The PLA Navy claimed that the INS Airavat was entering the territorial waters of China. Though the incident did not escalate and the INS Airavat was allowed to complete its journey, it did allow the Indian government to elaborate on their position in the South China Sea. India reiterated their belief in the freedom of navigation, in accordance with international law and the UNCLOS. In addition, it also shed light on the Chinese objections to Indian naval presence in a region, which they are rapidly scouring for oil, natural gas and other non-renewable resources.
Geopolitical Relations Between India and China
While the INS Airavat was the first incident that required a direct official statement by both countries on their respective positions in the South China Sea, the regional dispute has proven to be a nagging obstacle to the bilateral relations between India and China, due to several reasons.
Firstly, India has always been wary of China’s strong bilateral relations with Pakistan. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often emphasised the importance of keeping the threat of Pakistan at bay. In light of the pre-existing and continuing tensions between India and Pakistan, particularly on the border front, a strong Asian ally in the form of China could allow Pakistan to be more aggressive in their approach towards dealing with India.
Secondly, China remains wary of Indian naval presence in the South China Sea, which was well documented during the aforementioned INS Airavat incident. While China faces multiple competing claims from the likes of Vietnam and the Philippines (to name a few), none of these countries have the military size and prowess to rival that of China’s. India’s extensive military forces on the other hand could serve as an effective check on China’s ever expanding network of extraction (through off shore drilling sites) and naval presence, much like the US Navy does at present.
Thirdly, PM Modi’s attempts at fostering healthy bilateral relations with China has been stifled due to the eagerness of the Indian government to endorse the importance of freedom of navigation and the reluctance of the Chinese government to discuss the South China Sea issue in various multilateral forums.
Fourthly, the India-China relations have soured in the past year following the military “stand-of” at Doklam in 2017. The incident involved the Chinese military attempting to extend an existing road in Doklam further south. This drew the immediate attention of the Indian troops as Doklam was a disputed territory upon which Bhutan, India’s ally, had laid claim as well. This resulted in a series of accusations exchanged between both countries with respect to the transgression of the UN Charter and a violation of the 2012 India-China cross-border agreement. Both governments wisely chose a diplomatic route and the stand-off never escalated into a military conflict. However, it did succeed in significantly altering the respective views of India and China towards each other.
Lastly, there are a number of economic and political considerations at play here. PM Modi has facilitated a transition from the ‘Look East’ policy of the previous governments to the ‘Act East’ policy, which saw a greater emphasis placed by the Indian government on strengthening ties with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Two members of ASEAN, Philippines and Vietnam, serve as primary oppositions to China’s territorial claims based on the nine-dash line. This appears to be in conflict with India’s current position where China remains India’s largest trade partner. While there is a risk that India’s trade flow may take a hit, the Indian government has maintained their firm opposition towards what they perceive as an attempt by China to bully their way through international conflicts by way of their importance as a trade partner, status as the premier Asian superpower, and the might of their military forces.
Importantly, the upcoming 2019 elections could potentially result in a structural change in India’s government. If the recent elections in India are anything to go by, it remains uncertain if PM Modi will retain his position as the head of the government, which in turn could drastically affect the various policies adopted in the South China Sea.
In conclusion, like with all precarious and delicate geopolitical issues, the ever changing political landscape will continuously shape the factors at play, to hopefully achieve diplomatic solutions while avoiding military tensions and conflicts. The South China Sea dispute is no different.
Aditya Bhattacharya
December 28, 2018
source https://indiaoutbound.org/the-south-china-sea-conundrum-indias-role-and-involvement/
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